




THE THREAT OF LAW: REGULATORY 
BLACKMAIL OR AN ANSWER TO 
CONGRESSIONAL INACTION? 




     The administrative state has become an increasingly dominant force 
in American jurisprudence, at times wielding its power even beyond the 
reach of judicial and legislative control.1  Notwithstanding the fact that 
many legal scholars, regulated entities, and politicians have lamented the 
expanding role of the administrative state, regulatory agencies are more 
frequently flexing their newly acquired muscle and acting in 
contravention to traditional notions of checks and balances and 
delegatory norms.2 
In this Article, I will examine an administrative law phenomenon I 
term the “threat of law,” whereby an administrative agency unilaterally 
imposes its regulatory will on regulated entities on the boundaries of, or 
even outside of, the traditional rulemaking process. This “threat of law” 
goes beyond the idea of “agency threats” first examined by Tim Wu in 
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his 2011 Duke Law Journal essay.3  Wu, in examining, and ultimately 
defending the use of “agency threats,” specifically includes “warning 
letters, official speeches, interpretations, and private meetings with 
regulated parties.”4  However, he emphasizes that “agency threats” are 
“similar but not identical to the statutory category of ‘interpretative 
rules.’”5 As analyzed herein, the “threat of law” goes a step further than 
an “agency threat” and contemplates situations in which the regulatory 
body in fact does issue regulations.6  However, these regulations are 
grounded in dubious statutory authority and can leave regulated entities 
with the non-ideal options of complying with the disputable regulations, 
facing penalties and litigation, or fighting a protracted and expensive 
court battle to get the regulations overturned. 
Although I believe that an active “threat of law” can have 
implications in the regulatory world beyond the field of tax law,7 in order 
to illustrate the tangible pressure this threat of law can inflict on affected 
regulatees, this Article will focus on recent actions taken by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) in response to the growing tide 
of corporate tax inversion transactions.  During the last four years the 
U.S. tax system has experienced a flurry of corporate inversion 
transactions, whereby U.S. based multinational corporations “invert” by 
replacing their former U.S. parent with a foreign corporation, typically 
located in a low-tax jurisdiction, while making otherwise minimal 
changes to their actual day-to-day operations.8  The overall impact of an 
                                                          
 3.  Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1841–42 (2011).  See also Brigham Daniels, 
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inversion transaction is that it makes it easier for U.S. corporations to 
limit or avoid U.S. taxation on their worldwide earnings, while keeping 
the bulk of their operations in the United States.9 
By early 2014, the White House and certain members of Congress 
were making increasingly forceful statements against these transactions, 
which were believed to create a significant and immediate threat to the 
U.S. fisc.  President Obama made several speeches condemning 
corporate inversion transactions as violating “economic patriotism,” and 
began to put pressure on Congress and Treasury to take action.10 
On July 15, 2014, Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew sent a letter to 
Congress, imploring them to pass legislation to curb “this abuse of our 
tax system” and to make any legislation retroactive to May 2014.11  
Congress, however, was deadlocked and it was clear that it would be 
unable to pass any legislation in the foreseeable future.12  This stalemate 
                                                          
income-tax-rates-around-world-2015; OECD.Stat, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT (Nov. 21, 2016), http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?QueryId=58204#. 
 9.  The United States is one of only a handful of countries that make domestic corporations 
pay tax at the domestic corporate tax rate, even on income earned from foreign subsidiaries located 
in low-tax jurisdictions.  Even Canada and the United Kingdom only tax domestic profits.  A 
successfully tax inverted corporation significantly reduces the amount of corporate tax revenues 
received by the U.S. fisc.  Previously Congress passed I.R.C. section 7874 in the American Jobs Act 
of 2004, which was meant to prevent corporate tax inversions.  However, in recent years, taxpayers 
have developed inversion transaction structures that effectively exploit loopholes in I.R.C. section 
7874. 
 10.  See, e.g., Oliver Duggan, Barack Obama Attacks ‘Corporate Deserters’ in Tax Inversion 
Takeovers, THE TELEGRAPH (July 25, 2014, 2:03 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/10990994/Barack-Obama-attacks-corporate-deserters-in-tax-
inversion-takeovers.html.  President Obama acknowledged that these companies are “basically 
taking advantage of tax provisions that are technically legal,” but argued that “if you’re doing 
business here, if you’re basically still an American [company], but you’re simply changing your 
mailing address to avoid paying taxes, then you’re really not doing right by the country and by the 
American people.”  Interview by Steve Liesman with Barack Obama, President, United States, in 
Washington, D.C. (July 24, 2014), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000295639. 
 11.  Letter from Jacob Lew, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Dave Camp, Chairman of the Comm. on 
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (July 15, 2014), http://im.ft-
static.com/content/images/89217f94-0ca4-11e4-943b-00144feabdc0.pdf.  It is important to note that 
many taxpayers do not view inversions as abusive tax transactions.  Rather, they are viewed as 
legitimate methods of achieving tax reductions on their worldwide operations.  See, e.g., Diana 
Furchtgott-Roth, Tax Inversions Help, Not Hurt, the Economy, MARKET WATCH (Aug. 8, 2014, 7:20 
AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/tax-inversions-help-not-hurt-the-economy-2014-08-08. 
 12.  Stephen E. Shay, Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax Juice Out of Corporate Expatriations, 144 
TAX NOTES 473, 473 (2014) (“[I]n the current political environment there is little reason to believe 
that a statutory solution will be enacted.”); A’Dair Flynt, Notice 2014-52: The Treasury’s Response 
to Corporate Tax Inversions, LA. L. REV. (Nov. 19, 2014), 
http://lawreview.law.lsu.edu/2014/11/19/notice-2014-52-the-treasurys-response-to-corporate-tax-
inversions/#_ftn73; see generally Greve & Parrish, supra note 2; see Kelly Drye Client Advisory, 
Tax Inversions: Administrative and Legislative Responses, KELLEY DRYE (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/client_advisories/0930 (“Both ends of Pennsylvania 
Avenue reacted to the surge of inversions.  Although legislative action is likely impossible this year 
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in Congress left Treasury to attempt to curb the growing tide of inversion 
transactions.  However, at a press conference on July 16, 2014, Secretary 
Lew publicly declared, “we [at Treasury] do not believe we have the 
authority to address this inversion question through administrative 
action” without help from Congress.13  In fact, many practitioners, 
taxpayers, and academics likewise questioned whether Treasury could 
unilaterally act to stop corporate inversion transactions under the existing 
statutory and regulatory framework.14 
However, on July 29, 2014, former Treasury Deputy Assistant 
Secretary and Harvard Law School Professor Stephen Shay wrote an 
open letter to Secretary Lew in Tax Notes, a leading source of tax news 
for tax professionals, arguing that under his interpretation of the existing 
regulations, Treasury in fact could and should unilaterally issue 
regulations to stop inversion transactions.15  While it is unclear whether 
this letter by itself, or in combination with other factors finally pushed 
Secretary Lew to act, just two months after his own declaration that he 
was powerless to do so, Secretary Lew issued Notice 2014-52 (the 
“Inversion Notice”),16 outlining Treasury’s intention to issue a broad set 
of anti-inversion regulations that would put an end to (or at least a 
damper on) corporate inversions. 
Treasury’s abrupt turnabout in position and issuance of the Inversion 
Notice outlining broad retroactive regulatory action sent discernable 
shockwaves through the corporate and broader tax community.  
Academics and practitioners debated and questioned whether Treasury 
acted outside of the bounds of its statutory authority.17  In fact, Kimberly 
                                                          
and uncertain next year, several Members of Congress have circulated concepts to stop tax 
inversions and protect the flow of revenue to the U.S. Treasury.”). 
 13.  Steven Russolillo, In Opposing Tax Inversions, Treasury’s Lew Calls for ‘Economic 
Patriotism’, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2014, 9:16 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/16/in-
opposing-tax-inversions-treasurys-lew-calls-for-economic-patriotism/. 
 14.  See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew Says Anti-Inversion Decision 
Will Come Soon, URBAN WIRE (Sep. 8, 2014), http://www.urban.org/urban-wire/treasury-secretary-
jack-lew-says-anti-inversion-decision-will-come-soon; Joseph B. Darby III, Inverted Priorities: Why 
the Proposed Treasury Rules Are Unlikely to Stop Inversion Transactions, THOMSON REUTERS TAX 
& ACCT. (2014), 
http://www.sandw.com/assets/htmldocuments/Inverted%20Priorities.%20Darby%20Article%20B17
77290.PDF; Alex M. Parker, Executive Action on Inversions? Not So Fast., BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L 
TAX BLOG (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.bna.com/executive-action-inversions-b17179893937/. 
 15.  See Shay, supra note 12, at 473 (“[W]hen a material portion of the U.S. corporate tax base 
is at risk, doing nothing borders on the irresponsible.”). 
 16.  I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712. 
 17.  Thomas Lys, who teaches corporate restructuring at Northwestern University’s Kellogg 
School of Management, stated that “[i]t’s a stretch of current regulations” for the Executive Branch 
to act unilaterally.  Josh Lederman, Facing Logjam in Congress, Obama Seeks Steps to Curb Tax 
Breaks for Firms Moving Overseas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 5, 2014, 7:11 PM), 
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Blanchard, a leading tax practitioner, explicitly declared “if challenged in 
court, most of the rules in the [Inversion] Notice would not stand.”18  
Taxpayers directly affected by the Inversion Notice were left scratching 
their heads.19  Some were in the middle of inversion transactions that 
were not yet closed.20  Others were in serious discussions to consider 
inverting offshore.21  In fact, in October 2014, AbbVie, Inc. called off the 
largest proposed U.S. company inversion with U.K.-based Shire Plc., a 
$54.8 billion transaction that was supposed to lower AbbVie’s tax 
liability from twenty-two percent to thirteen percent.22  AbbVie agreed to 
pay a $1.635 billion break-up fee to its rival Shire Plc. rather than move 
forward with the deal, and directly cited the Inversion Notice as the 
reason its board of directors withdrew support for the transaction.23 
                                                          
http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2014/08/05/obama-seeks-executive-ways-to-limit-tax-
inversions.  But see Shay, supra note 12, at 473 (“One of the Treasury secretary’s most important 
responsibilities is the health of the tax system under the laws adopted by Congress.  Congress has 
given Treasury broad and in some cases sweeping authority to adopt regulations, including specific 
grants of authority that bear on issues at the heart of corporate inversions.”). 
 18.  Kimberly S. Blanchard, Would a Court Uphold the Application of Notice 2014-52 to 
Combinations Closed After September 21, 2014?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 10, 2015), 
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/would-a-court-uphold-the-application-of-notice-
201452.pdf.  
 19.  See, e.g., John F. Darcy, Current Events in Federal Income Tax: Selected Regulations, 
Rulings and Cases at 73, 42ND ANNUAL VT. TAX SEMINAR 2014 RESOURCE GUIDE (last visited Jan. 
26, 2016), http://www.vttaxseminar.org/documents/2014/RESOURCE%20GUIDE.pdf (“The rules 
described in Notice 2014-52 reflect an expansive interpretation of section 7701(l)’s authority to 
address ‘multiple-party financing transactions.’  Integration of business operations is not commonly 
considered a ‘financing transaction.’  The recast described in Notice 2014-52 creates ambiguous and 
counter-intuitive results for what would normally be straightforward transactions. . . . Legislation 
enacted section 304(b)(5)(B) in 2010.  The statute appears to require only 50% U.S. taxation on a 
targeted constructive dividend.  Nevertheless, in Notice 2014-52, Treasury has interpreted its 
regulatory authority under the rule to allow it to further tighten the statutory rule.”). 
 20.  For instance, AbbVie, Inc., a North Chicago, Illinois-based pharmaceutical company had 
agreed to buy U.K.-based Shire Plc. for $54 billion and Mylan Laboratories, a Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania-based pharmaceutical company had agreed to buy Abbott Laboratories’ Netherlands-
based international generic business.  Nathan Vardi, AbbVie to Buy Shire for $54 Billion in Biggest 
Inversion Deal Ever, FORBES (July 18, 2014, 7:18 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2014/07/18/abbvie-to-buy-shire-for-54-billion-in-biggest-
inversion-deal-ever/. 
 21.  Walgreen Co. was contemplating relocating to Switzerland.  Paul Ziobro, Walgreen Weighs 
Riding Tax-Inversion Wave, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2014, 7:21 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/walgreen-weighs-riding-tax-inversion-wave-1405453698.  Pfizer Inc. 
was still weighing inversion deals following its failed bid to invert by buying U.K.-based 
AstraZeneca Plc. in March 2014.  Maureen Farrell, Pfizer CEO is Still Weighing Inversion Deals, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/12/pfizer-ceo-is-
still-weighing-inversion-deals/. 
 22.  Simeon Bennett & Caroline Chen, AbbVie Becomes Biggest U.S. Company To Move 
Domestic Address in $55 Billion Deal, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) NO. 139, at G-2 (July 18, 2014). 
 23.  Josh Beckerman, AbbVie, Shire Terminate Year’s Biggest Deal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 
2014, 6:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/abbvie-shire-terminate-what-was-years-biggest-deal-
1413841225 (AbbVie stated the Inversion Notice “reinterpreted long-standing tax principles in a 
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AbbVie’s chairman and CEO, Richard A. Gonzalez, declared “[t]he 
unprecedented unilateral action by the U.S. Department of Treasury may 
have destroyed the value in this transaction . . . .”24  Salix Pharmaceutical 
also cancelled its proposed inversion transaction, claiming the Inversion 
Notice created “more uncertainty regarding the potential benefits we 
expected to achieve.”25 
What, if anything, could these affected companies do to challenge 
this sweeping action by Treasury if indeed Treasury did overstep its 
regulatory authority?  Unfortunately for them, the answer was very little 
other than to proceed at their own risk.  This is true even in light of the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Mayo Foundation for Medical 
Education and Research et al. v. United States26 that tax and the 
Treasury are not special.  This declaration by the Supreme Court 
purportedly ended the prior reign of so-called “tax exceptionalism,” 
suggesting that tax regulations should be treated the same as regulations 
issued by any other administrative body.27  However, even in the shadow 
of Mayo, because of Treasury’s explicit statutory grant to issue 
retroactive regulations, the broad protections against pre-enforcement 
judicial review afforded to it by statute, and the judicial deference it is 
afforded, successfully challenging Treasury’s abuse of power remains an 
uphill, long, and expensive battle for taxpayers. 
In light of the obstacles affected taxpayers are up against in the face 
of regulations of dubious authority, Treasury is able to wield what I term 
an effective “threat of law.”  While certainly less binding than an actual 
legitimately exercised “force of law,” the effects (at least in the near-
term) can be identical.  For example, with respect to the Inversion 
Notice, taxpayers could either comply with Treasury’s Inversion Notice 
or potentially face a myriad of negative consequences.  When faced with 
                                                          
uniquely selective manner designed specifically to destroy the financial benefits of these types of 
transactions.”). 
 24.  Associated Press, Shire Gets $1.64B Breakup Fee from AbbVie, CBS MONEYWATCH (Oct. 
20, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/shire-gets-1-64b-breakup-fee-from-abbvie/. 
 25.  Are the new IRS Inversion Regulations in Notice 2014-52 Working?, SHERAYZEN LAW 
OFFICE PLLC (Nov. 9, 2014), http://sherayzenlaw.com/are-the-new-irs-inversion-regulations-in-
notice-2014-52-working/.  Minnesota-based Medtronic still closed its deal to invert to Ireland, but 
significantly restructured its transaction as a result of the Inversion Notice, limiting some of the 
potential tax benefits.  Rakesh Sharma, Medtronic Avoids U.S. Taxes While Saddling Shareholders 
With a Hefty Tax Bill, THE STREET (Jan. 28, 2015, 6:01 AM), 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/13024863/2/medtronic-avoids-us-taxes-while-saddling-shareholders-
with-a-hefty-tax-bill.html (“As a result of the notice, Medtronic, which had originally intended to 
finance the transaction using its $13.5 billion cash reserves from earnings abroad, was forced to 
borrow $16 billion.”).  
 26.  562 U.S. 44, 57–58 (2011). 
 27.  Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 466 (2013). 
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these options, while some taxpayers rolled the proverbial dice and found 
ways to structure around the Inversion Notice,28 others declined to play 
this game of tax chicken with Treasury and called off their transactions.29 
In this Article, I will explore the contours of this so-called “threat of 
law” that Treasury can employ even in the absence of legitimate 
congressional authority to do so.  Part II of this Article gives a brief 
background of the history of the regulation of corporate inversions in the 
United States.  Part III discusses Treasury’s generally broad regulatory 
powers, including its ability to issue retroactive regulations.  Part IV 
discusses the justiciability obstacles that taxpayers face in bringing suit 
against Treasury, including I.R.C. section 7421 and the Declaratory 
Judgment Act (“DJA”).30  It also discusses the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Mayo and the level of deference Treasury regulations 
are afforded.  Part V then examines the implications that Treasury’s 
regulatory powers, Chevron deference, and litigation standing safeguards 
have on its use of the threat of law.  Specifically, it will explore the 
efficacy this threat of law can have on Treasury’s ability to act swiftly in 
response to emerging tax challenges.  Moreover, it will address the 
implications this threat has for Treasury’s statutory retroactivity powers, 
traditional notions underlying Congress’s perceived delegation of 
authority to Treasury, and to the justiciability protections these actions 
should be afforded.  Part VI concludes. 
II. THE INVERSION GUIDANCE SAGA 
As mentioned above, a U.S.-based multinational corporation engages 
in a so-called “inversion” transaction by replacing its former U.S. parent 
with a foreign corporation, typically located in a low-tax jurisdiction, 
while making otherwise minimal changes to its actual day-to-day 
operations.31  While many of the inverted companies continue to have a 
substantial continuing U.S. presence, the inverted structure makes it 
                                                          
 28.  The Medtronic deal still closed, albeit with revised terms.  See Sharma, supra note 25 and 
accompanying text.  
 29.  AbbVie, Inc. canceled its planned inversion at a cost of over $1 billion.  See supra notes 
20–24 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text, describing how 
Pfizer and Allergan called off their proposed merger in light of the Inversion Regulations. 
 30.  28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000). 
 31.  Typically this structure allows corporations to significantly reduce their overall effective 
tax rate.  The United States still has the highest statutory corporate tax rate of the OECD countries at 
35 percent, and the third highest overall marginal corporate tax rate in the world (exceeded only by 
Chad and the United Arab Emirates).  See Pomerleau, supra note 8. 
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easier for the U.S. corporations to limit or avoid U.S. taxation on their 
worldwide earnings.32 
Back in 2004 Treasury responded to an initial wave of inversions 
that took place in the early 2000s by passing I.R.C. section 7874,33 which 
specifically targets and penalizes these transactions.  In particular, I.R.C. 
section 7874 disregards the inversion and continues to treat the new 
foreign parent as a U.S. corporation for tax purposes if a U.S.-based 
entity restructures such that the former U.S. parent is replaced by a 
foreign parent and (1) less than 25 percent of the new foreign entity’s 
business activity “is in the home country of the new foreign parent,” and 
“(2) the shareholders of the old U.S. parent end up owning at least [sixty] 
percent of the shares of the new foreign parent.”34  Inverted corporations 
that have a greater than sixty percent, but less than eighty percent, 
continuing ownership stake by the shareholders from the former U.S. 
parent are not treated as U.S. corporations, but are subject to other 
potentially adverse tax consequences.35  These consequences, however, 
are more avoidable and multinational corporations have readily exploited 
these loopholes. 
Thus, although the existing I.R.C. section 7874 provisions 
effectively shut down inversions involving ownership levels of at least 
eighty percent, they have been ineffective in stopping inversions at lower 
ownership thresholds, and the current wave of inversions involves 
transactions with a continuing ownership interest under eighty percent.36  
As Treasury has acknowledged: “Current law subjects inversions that 
appear to be based primarily on tax considerations to certain potentially 
adverse tax consequences, but it has become clear by the growing pace 
of these transactions that for many corporations, these consequences are 
acceptable in light of the potential benefits.”37  It is estimated that over 
twenty U.S.-based companies have inverted since 2012.38 
                                                          
 32.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 33.  All section references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and 
the Treasury regulations issued thereunder. 
 34.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Actions to Rein in 
Corporate Tax Inversions (Sept. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl2645.aspx; I.R.C. § 7874(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3. 
 35.  In particular, these entities will be taxed on any gain from their post-inversion transfer of 
assets.  I.R.C. §§ 7874(a)(1), (d)(2). 
 36.  Fact Sheet, supra note 34. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Jeffrey McCracken, Pfizer to Terminate $160 Billion Merger With Allergan, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 5, 2016, 8:24 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-06/pfizer-allergan-plan-
to-mutually-end-merger-cnbc-reports (“Since the first inversion in 1982, 53 U.S. companies have 
shifted their tax addresses offshore—22 of them since 2012.”); Zachary Mider & Jesse Drucker, Tax 
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Treasury and Congress were under significant pressure from 
President Obama, the media, and prominent tax scholars to take 
immediate and decisive action to stop the surge of inversion activity.39  
However, notwithstanding even a direct plea to Congress by Secretary 
Lew to pass legislation to end inversion transactions, Congress declined 
to do so.  This is true even though both sides of the aisle publicly 
supported taking actions to curb these transactions.40 
As discussed above, in the absence of congressional action, 
Treasury’s initial response to the new flurry of inversion activity was to 
issue the Inversion Notice.  Although Treasury itself acknowledged that 
the Inversion Notice was not a complete solution, it issued the notice in 
hopes that it would at least slow down the flow of inversion transactions.  
The Inversion Notice involved five different I.R.C. sections—
304(b)(5)(B), 367, 956(e), 770(l), and 7874—and was intended to attack 
two different aspects of inversion transactions. 
First, the Inversion Notice outlined rules designed to attack pre-
inversion tactical moves by treating more inverted companies as U.S. 
corporations.41  For instance, I.R.C. section 7874(b) clearly establishes 
an ownership percentage of eighty percent (i.e., at least eighty percent of 
the new foreign corporation is held by the former U.S. corporation 
shareholders) in order to treat the foreign acquirer as a U.S. corporation.  
Although Treasury clearly lacked the power to rewrite the specific eighty 
percent threshold written by Congress, it opted to instead exercise its 
purported regulatory powers to change what goes into the ownership 
fraction.  By proposing rules to maximize what is included in the 
numerator and minimize what is included in denominator, the rules 
outlined in the Inversion Notice had the practical effect of decreasing the 
                                                          
Inversion: How U.S. Companies Buy Tax Breaks, BLOOMBERG QUICK TAKE (Apr. 6, 2016, 5:15 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/tax-inversion; Donald J. Marples & Jane G. Gravelle, 
Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. 2 (Apr. 27, 2016), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43568.pdf. 
 39.  See, e.g., Oliver Duggan, Barack Obama Attacks ‘Corporate Deserters’ in Tax Inversion 
Takeovers, TELEGRAPH (July 25, 2014, 2:03 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/10990994/Barack-Obama-attacks-corporate-deserters-in-tax-
inversion-takeovers.html.  Even presidential candidates in the 2016 election from both sides of the 
aisle denounced corporate inversions.  Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and Donald Trump all called 
for an end to the practice.  See Jennifer Surane, Johnson Controls Merges With Tyco in Tax-
Lowering Maneuver, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Jan. 25, 2016, 6:07 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-25/johnson-controls-to-combine-with-tyco-move-
domicile-to-ireland. 
 40.  Notwithstanding their agreement in principle, a large disparity in approach exists in how to 
deal with the inversion problem.   
 41.  Specifically, they address pre-inversion tactical moves including cash-box techniques, 
skinny-down techniques, and spin-versions.  See Fact Sheet, supra note 34. 
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ownership percentage required by the existing statute.42  Second, the 
Inversion Notice took aim at post-inversion transactions intended to 
allow the newly inverted corporations to access foreign earnings without 
incurring additional U.S. taxes.43  Importantly, the Inversion Notice 
announced that once actual regulations were issued they would be 
retroactive to the date of the Inversion Notice, September 22, 2014.44 
The IRS issued a second inversion notice on November 19, 2015, 
announcing its intention to issue additional regulations targeting 
inversion transactions (the “Second Inversion Notice,” and together with 
the “Inversion Notice,” the “Inversion Notices”).  In addition to making 
corrections and clarifications to some of the rules put forth in the 
Inversion Notice, the Second Inversion Notice announced additional 
guidance aimed at both limiting inversion transactions themselves45 and 
limiting post-inversion benefits.46 
Most recently, in April and October 2016, Treasury issued 
regulations targeting inversion transactions (the “Inversion 
Regulations”).47  The Inversion Regulations are comprised of temporary 
regulations formalizing the rules set forth in the Inversion Notices, as 
                                                          
 42.  Kimberly S. Blanchard, Extensive New Anti-Inversion Rules Issued, 145 TAX NOTES 89 
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/145tn0089.pdf (“[The IRS] continued its pattern of 
stretching its regulatory authority to the limit—some would say beyond the limit—to reach as many 
transactions as possible by adopting rules to minimize the denominator and maximize the numerator 
of the ownership fraction, goosing the fraction upward.”). 
 43.  Specifically, they address techniques involving hopscotch loans, de-controlling strategies, 
and the repatriation of trapped cash.  See Fact Sheet, supra note 34.  It is estimated that U.S. 
corporations have parked as much as $2 trillion in cash overseas.  Julie Hirschfeld Davis, White 
House Weighs Actions to Deter Overseas Tax Flight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/business/Action-in-washington-on-corporate-inversions.html. 
 44.  I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712. 
 45.  Specifically, the IRS will target abusive inversion transactions by “(i) requiring the foreign 
acquiring corporation to be subject to tax as a resident of the relevant foreign country in order to 
have substantial business activities in the relevant foreign country; (ii) disregarding certain stock of 
the foreign acquiring corporation in ‘third-country’ transactions; and (iii) clarifying the definition of 
nonqualified property for purposes of disregarding certain stock of the foreign acquiring 
corporation.”  I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775. 
 46.  Treasury intends to address post-inversion transactions by “(i) defining inversion gain for 
purposes of section 7874 to include certain income or gain recognized by an expatriated entity from 
an indirect transfer or license of property and providing for aggregate treatment of certain transfers 
or licenses of property by foreign partnerships for purposes of determining inversion gain; and (ii) 
requiring an exchanging shareholder to recognize all of the gain realized upon an exchange of stock 
of a controlled foreign corporation. . . .”  Id. 
 47.  Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.304-7T(e), 1.367(a)-3T(c)(11)(ii), 1.367(b)-4T(h), 1.956-2T(i), 
1.7701(l)-4T(h), 1.7874-1T(h)(2), 1.7874-2T(l)(2), 1.7874-3T(f)(2), 1.7874-4T(k)(1), 1.7874-6T(h), 
1.7874-7T(h), 1.7874-8T(i), 1.7874-9T(g), 1.7874-10T(i), 1.7874-11T(f), 1.7874-12T(b) (as 
amended by T.D. 9761, 81 Fed. Reg. 20857); Prop. Treas. Reg. 108060-15, 2016-17 I.R.B. 636, 
63681 Fed. Reg. 20588 (Apr. 25, 2016). 
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well as additional rules not covered in the Inversion Notices.48  
Moreover, as promised in the Second Inversion Notice,49 Treasury issued 
proposed regulations targeting one of the primary post-inversion benefits 
of inversion transactions–earnings stripping.50  Congressional hearings 
were held regarding the proposed earnings stripping regulations in July 
2016,51 and members of the House Ways and Means Committee even 
urged Treasury not to finalize the regulations without further review, 
arguing that they could “have a significant adverse impact on the 
American economy, discouraging investment and hurting American jobs 
and workers.”52  Undeterred, a few weeks later, Treasury finalized a 
more tailored version of the regulations in October 2016.53  Earnings 
stripping is an important post-inversion technique because even after an 
inversion, a U.S. corporation’s U.S.-based businesses are still taxed by 
the United States at U.S. tax rates.  In an attempt to lower the taxes still 
                                                          
 48.  Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.304-7T(e), 1.367(a)-3T(c)(11)(ii), 1.367(b)-4T(h), 1.956-2T(i), 
1.7701(l)-4T(h), 1.7874-1T(h)(2), 1.7874-2T(l)(2), 1.7874-3T(f)(2), 1.7874-4T(k)(1), 1.7874-6T(h), 
1.7874-7T(h), 1.7874-8T(i), 1.7874-9T(g), 1.7874-10T(i), 1.7874-11T(f), 1.7874-12T(b) (as 
amended by T.D. 9761, 81 Fed. Reg. 20857). 
 49.  I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 784 (“The Treasury Department and the IRS expect 
to issue additional guidance to further limit (i) inversion transactions that are contrary to the 
purposes of section 7874 and (ii) the benefits of post-inversion tax avoidance transactions.  In 
particular, as described in section 5 of Notice 2014-52, the Treasury Department and the IRS 
continue to consider guidance to address strategies that avoid U.S. tax on U.S. operations by shifting 
or ‘stripping’ U.S.-source earnings to lower-tax jurisdictions, including through intercompany debt.  
Accordingly, the Treasury Department and the IRS reiterate the requests for comments made in 
Notice 2014-52.”).  
 50.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.304-7, 1.367(a)-3, 1.367(b)-4, 1.956-2, 1.7701(l)-4, 1.7874-1, 
1.7874-2, 1.7874-3, 1.7874-4, 1.7874-6, 1.7874-7, 1.7874-8, 1.7874-9, 1.7874-10, 1.7874-11, 
1.7874-12, 81 Fed. Reg. 20588 (Apr. 8, 2016).  Treasury and academic scholars have both conducted 
studies analyzing the extensive impact that earnings stripping can have on inverted entities.  See U.S. 
Dep’t Treas., Report to The Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax 
Treaties (Nov. 2007); Jim Seida & William Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings 
Stripping Following Corporate Inversion, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 805 (2004) (studying twelve corporate 
inversions and finding that earnings stripping was the primary mechanism to reduce tax liability).  
See also Steven Solomon, Corporate Inversions Aren’t the Half of It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/business/dealbook/corporate-inversions-arent-the-half-of-
it.html (“[T]he bulk of the benefits of an inversion may come not from the lower foreign tax rate but 
from substantially reducing taxes on the American subsidiary [through earnings stripping].”). 
 51.  IRS, Treatment of a Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness; Hearing, 
FEDERAL REGISTER (July 14, 2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/06/21/2016-
14734/treatment-of-a-certain-interests-in-corporations-as-stock-or-indebtedness-hearing. 
 52.  See David Morgan, Republicans Asked U.S. Administration Not to Finalize Inversion 
Rules, REUTERS BUS. NEWS (Oct. 5, 2016, 1:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-
inversions-idUSKCN12525R. 
 53.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385–3, 1.385–4, 1.752–2, 81 Fed. Reg. 72858 (Oct. 21, 2016).  See 
Richard Rubin, Treasury Announces Final Regulations on Earnings Stripping, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 
2016, 6:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-announces-final-regulations-on-earnings-
stripping-1476392428. 
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owed to the United States, the existing U.S. business units of the inverted 
corporation borrow large amounts of money from their now-foreign 
parent.  Under pre-existing U.S. tax laws, the U.S. subsidiaries could 
take deductions for the interest paid to the foreign parents, thereby 
reducing their U.S. tax liability.  The Inversion Regulations are more far 
reaching than most had anticipated, and practitioners and corporations 
alike have lamented their overbroad application and dubious statutory 
authority.54 
Nevertheless, the Inversion Regulations still pose a substantial, 
although not insurmountable, roadblock for companies still considering 
moving their tax headquarters out of the United States.55  The Kelley 
Drye & Warren LLP announcement regarding the initial Inversion 
Notice described the effect as follows: 
Treasury clearly has put a monkey wrench in plans no matter how 
much the companies involved may argue to the contrary.  It is simply 
not possible to blindly stick with plans in light of Treasury’s announced 
intention to find key elements of these planned mergers as illegitimate 
tax dodges.  In the end, it may be that the companies involved are still 
able to restructure plans and proceed with planned tax inversions 
perhaps preparing years of litigation with U.S. tax authorities, but the 
risks and uncertainties for pursuing tax inversions have clearly been 
raised and that will eventually impact business planning.56 
In addition to having to execute a transaction imbued with significant 
uncertainties as to whether tax benefits will be able to be realized, 
taxpayers that chose not to comply with the Inversion Notices or choose 
not to comply with the Inversion Regulations may be subject to I.R.C. 
section 6662 understatement penalties.57  Moreover, taxpayers likely will 
not be able to challenge the legitimacy of the Inversion Notices or 
                                                          
 54.  Lynnley Browning & Saleha Mohsin, Treasury Corporate-Debt Rules Exceed Authority, 
Tax Lawyers Say, BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2016, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-15/treasury-corporate-debt-rules-exceed-
authority-tax-lawyers-say. 
 55.  While the Inversion Regulations apply to transactions entered into on or after April 4, 
2016, the rules outlined in the Inversion Notice apply to transactions entered into on or after 
September 22, 2014 and the rules outlined in the Second Inversion Notice apply to transactions 
entered into on or after November 19, 2016. 
 56.  Kelley Drye Client Advisory, Tax Inversions: Administrative and Legislative Responses, 
KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/client_advisories/0930/_pdf/style=pdf/client_advisories_09
30.pdf. 
 57.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (“If any portion of an underpayment, as defined in section 6664(a) 
and §1.6664-2, of any income tax imposed under subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code that is 
required to be shown on a return is attributable to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, 
there is added to the tax an amount equal to 20 percent of such portion.”). 
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Regulations until they file a return, and either sue for a refund or fail to 
comply with the Inversion Regulations and defend a suit of deficiency by 
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  Once in court, the taxpayer would 
then have to be successful in its claim that Treasury exceeded its 
regulatory authority in issuing the Inversion Notices or Regulations. 
Rather than openly defy the Inversion Notices and Regulations, some 
taxpayers found ways to circumvent them altogether and proceeded with 
their inversions despite the murky regulatory landscape.  For example, 
Burger King completed its planned inversion by acquiring Canadian 
company Tim Hortons in December 2014, in part because the new 
foreign entity has far in excess of the twenty-five percent business 
activities in Canada necessary to prevent application of the inversion 
provisions under I.R.C. section 7874.58  In January 2016, Johnson 
Controls announced plans to invert by merging with Ireland-based Tyco 
International Plc.59  In the Johnson Controls deal, shareholders of the 
existing U.S. companies were expected to own just shy of the sixty 
percent ownership threshold necessary to trigger the Inversion Notices 
and I.R.C. section 7874.60 
In one of the biggest inversion-related standoffs with Treasury, in 
November 2015, days after issuance of the Second Inversion Notice, 
Pfizer announced an over $150 billion inversion deal with Ireland-based 
Allergan, the maker of Botox.61  Reportedly, Pfizer and Allergan knew 
that Treasury would come after them over the transaction, but had no 
idea that it would issue such far-reaching regulations that essentially 
gutted many of the planned financial benefits of the merger.62  In fact, in 
                                                          
 58.  The deal was projected to save Burger King approximately $275 million in taxes between 
2015 and 2018 according to Wall Street estimates.  Kevin Drawbaugh, Burger King To Save 
Millions in U.S. Taxes in ‘Inversion’: Study, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2014, 5:31 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/11/us-usa-tax-burgerking-idUSKBN0JP0CI20141211.  
Notably, unlike some other potential U.S. corporate inverters, Burger King is already exempt from 
some of the restrictions because the combined Burger King/Tim Hortons enterprise has substantial 
Canadian operations.  Richard Rubin, Burger King Deal Advances Amid U.S. Inversion Crackdown, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2014, 3:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-23/lew-
tries-to-limit-tax-cut-deals-with-inversion-crackdown. 
 59.  Andrew Sorkin, A Tidal Wave of Corporate Migrants Seeking (Tax) Shelter, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/business/dealbook/a-tidal-wave-of-corporate-
migrants-seeking-tax-shelter.html. 
 60.  Id. (“[T]he Treasury Department implemented a rule that an American company could not 
complete an inversion if it owned more than 60 percent of the combined company; Johnson Controls 
will own 56 percent of the combined company.”). 
 61.  Jonathan D. Rockoff & Dana Mattioli, Pfizer, Allergan Agree on Historic Merger Deal, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 7:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-allergan-on-cusp-of-
merger-deal-1448217490. 
 62.  Michael J. de la Merced & Leslie Picker, Pfizer and Allergan Are Said to End Merger as 
Tax Rules Tighten, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), 
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a clear victory for Treasury, within twenty-four hours of the issuance of 
the Inversion Regulations, Pfizer terminated the planned merger with 
Allergan, even though it had to pay a $400 million break-up fee.63 
Notwithstanding Treasury’s “victory” over Pfizer, at least five other 
planned inversions remained on-track to close in 2016,64 although all 
comply with the Inversion Regulations.65  The persistence of inversion 
deals, even in the face of the Inversion Regulations, underscores the 
necessity of congressional involvement for any permanent solution, 
should one be desired.66  In fact, when issuing the Inversion Regulations, 
Secretary Lew again implored Congress to tackle the inversion issue.67  
As it impatiently waits for Congress to respond, Treasury has announced 
it will continue to expand its regulatory reach as far as possible in order 
to cast as large of a shadow as it can on these transactions, even if it is 
ultimately not able to stop them entirely.68 
III. THE MUSCLE BEHIND THE THREAT: TREASURY’S BROAD 
REGULATORY POWERS 
In order to be valid, all agency issued regulations, including 
regulations issued by Treasury, must be promulgated pursuant to a 
                                                          
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/dealbook/tax-inversion-obama-treasury.html?_r=0. 
 63.  Jeffrey McCracken, Pfizer to Terminate $160 Billion Merger With Allergan, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 5, 2016, 8:24 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-06/pfizer-allergan-plan-
to-mutually-end-merger-cnbc-reports. 
 64.  Amy Thomson, Pfizer-Allergan’s Tie-Up Isn’t the Only Inversion in Town, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 5, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-05/pfizer-allergan-s-tie-
up-isn-t-the-only-inversion-in-town?nl=dealbook&emc=edit_dlbkam_20160406. 
 65.  For instance, by structuring to avoid triggering the thresholds for application of the 
inversion provisions. 
 66.  Sorkin, supra note 59 (“By my count, based on a series of conversations with investment 
bankers, there are probably at least another dozen deals of meaningful size being negotiated in the 
pipeline.  The question is what it will take for Congress to not only take notice, but to pass 
legislation to thwart this steady corporate migration.”). 
 67.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Treasury Sec’y Jacob J. Lew on a 
Press Conference Call Regarding Announcement on Corporate Tax Inversions (Apr. 4, 2016) 
[hereinafter Press Release, Remarks by Treasury] (“Congress should not wait to act as inversions 
continue to erode our tax base.  Only congressional action can fully address inversion transactions, 
and I urge Congress to act this year.”), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl0406.aspx.  See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: 
Additional Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0281.aspx (“Only legislation can 
decisively stop inversions.”). 
 68.  Press Release, Remarks by Treasury, supra note 67 (“We will continue to explore 
additional ways to limit inversions.  But only new anti-inversion legislation can stop these 
transactions.  Until that time, creative accountants and lawyers will continue to seek new ways for 
companies to move their tax residences overseas and avoid paying taxes here at home.”). 
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delegation of authority by Congress.69  I.R.C. section 7805(a) grants 
Treasury broad regulatory powers by authorizing it to provide “all 
needful rules and regulations” necessary to enforce the Internal Revenue 
Code.  Moreover, a great number of provisions in the Internal Revenue 
Code also contain specific grants of statutory authority for Treasury to 
issue corresponding regulations.70  Treasury regulations are generally 
presumed to carry the force of law if they implement the underlying 
statute in a reasonable manner.71  The Supreme Court has stated that this 
delegation of regulatory authority is necessary in order to ensure the 
rules are written by “masters of the subject,” who are “responsible for 
putting the rules into effect.”72 
Moreover, although Treasury regulations are now presumed to be 
prospective in application,73 under I.R.C. section 7805(b) Treasury can 
make any regulation effective as early as the date of a notice of intention 
to issue regulations (without any special cause) or if the regulation is 
intended to “prevent abuse,” it may be retroactive to any date deemed 
necessary by Treasury.74  This gives Treasury latitude to issue binding 
regulations that are retroactive in nature before they have undergone 
notice and comment.  Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 
nonbinding proposed regulations are supposed to be issued pursuant to 
notice and comment and, after proper consideration of public input, final 
prospective binding regulations are issued.75  Treasury’s specific 
statutory grant of retroactive authority, however, supersedes the APA’s 
general regulatory requirements.76 
                                                          
 69.  City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1882 (2013).  
 70.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 301(e)(4) (Distributions of Property) (“The Secretary shall prescribe such 
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subsection.”); § 
385(a) (Treatment of certain interests in corporations as stock or indebtedness) (“The Secretary is 
authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an 
interest in a corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title as stock or indebtedness (or as in 
part stock and in part indebtedness).”); § 1092(c)(4)(H) (Exception for certain straddles) (“The 
Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
purposes of this paragraph.  Such regulations may include modifications to the provisions of this 
paragraph which are appropriate to take account of changes in the practices of option exchanges or 
to prevent the use of options for tax avoidance purposes.”). 
 71.  Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476–77 (1979). 
 72.  Id. at 477 (citing United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1878)). 
 73.  Prior to the passage of I.R.C. § 7805 in 1996, all Treasury regulations could apply to 
transactions executed prior to their enactment, subject to “abuse of discretion.” 
 74.  Congress did not define “abuse” thus leaving open the question of whether Treasury is also 
able to unilaterally decide when “abuse” is occurring.  See generally, Shannon Weeks McCormack, 
Tax Abuse According to Whom?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2013). 
 75.  See 5 U.S.C.S. § 553(b)–(c) (2016). 
 76.  See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974) (“Where there is no clear 
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless 
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Thus, Treasury’s broad regulatory powers strengthen its power to 
wield a threat of law in two ways.  First, because Congress has explicitly 
given Treasury broad general regulatory powers under I.R.C. section 
7805(a), even when Congress has not enacted a specific delegation of 
authority to Treasury with respect to a tax statute, Treasury is often 
nevertheless able to issue legally binding regulations.  For analytical 
purposes, the question then is not typically whether Treasury has 
authority to regulate a specific matter, but rather what the proper scope 
of the authority should be. 
Most of Treasury’s regulations derive their authority from the 
general delegation under I.R.C. section 7805.77  Moreover, even if a 
specific delegation exists with respect to a particular topic, that authority 
is merely in addition to, and not in lieu of, the general regulatory 
authority granted to Treasury under I.R.C. section 7805.78  With respect 
to the Inversion Notices and Regulations, Congress has explicitly given 
Treasury broad regulatory authority under I.R.C. section 7874.79  
Because Congress has explicitly handed over significant rulemaking 
power to Treasury, the line between overreaching by Treasury and a 
legitimate delegation of authority by Congress is blurry at best.  This 
makes it much more difficult for a taxpayer to determine ex ante whether 
it will be able to mount a successful legal claim that Treasury has 
overstepped its regulatory limits.  If taxpayers are truly unclear about the 
legitimacy of their legal challenges, rather than engage in protracted and 
expensive litigation with the IRS, they may choose to simply comply 
with (or structure around) the dubious regulation.80 
                                                          
of the priority of enactment.”). 
 77.  Blanchard, supra note 18, at 5.  
 78.  Id. 
 79.  I.R.C. § 7874(g) (“The Secretary shall provide such regulations as are necessary to carry 
out this section, including regulations providing for such adjustments to the application of this 
section as are necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this section, including the 
avoidance of such purposes through — (1) the use of related persons, pass-through or other 
noncorporate entities, or other intermediaries, or (2) transactions designed to have persons cease to 
be (or not become) members of expanded affiliated groups or related persons.”).  
 80.  Interestingly, in August of 2016, not taxpayers, but rather the United States Chamber of 
Commerce and the Texas Association of Business, filed a lawsuit against the IRS challenging the 
validity of the temporary Inversion Regulations issued in April of 2016.  Complaint at 1, Chamber of 
Commerce v. I.R.S., No. 1:16-cv-944, W.D. Tex. (Aug. 4, 2016),  
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/sites/default/files/cases/files/16161616/Complaint%20—
%20Chamber%20of%20Commerce%20v.%20IRS%20%28USDC%20-
%20Western%20District%20of%20Texas%29_0.pdf.  It is unclear, however, if the suit will survive 
the anticipated procedural hurdles, such as the Anti-Injunction Act.  See infra Part IV.A.  See also 
Alison Bennett  Lawsuit on IRS Inversion Rules May Be ‘Fascinating’ Battle, BLOOMBERG BNA 
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.bna.com/lawsuit-irs-inversion-n73014446237/. 
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Second, because I.R.C. section 7805(b) allows Treasury to backdate 
regulations retroactively to the date “on which any notice substantially 
describing the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final 
regulation is issued to the public,” Treasury is able to easily engage in 
retroactive rule making through the use of notices.  Indeed, both of the 
Inversion Notices explicitly provide that any regulations issued pursuant 
to the notices will be made retroactive to the date of the respective 
notices.81  As a result, Treasury is able to strengthen its threat of law 
because although a notice itself may not carry with it the force of law, to 
the extent that it substantially describes regulations that are intended to 
be issued at some future date, the notice is imbued with a pseudo force of 
law.  Taxpayers must in many ways treat a notice with increased 
deference because at some future date, if final regulations described in 
the notice are issued, the full legal force of those regulations may be 
retroactive to the notice date. Treasury’s ability to threaten a 
retroactively effective force of law compels taxpayers to comply with 
regulations described in a notice in the same way as they would a duly 
issued final regulation, because ultimately the penalty, audit, and 
litigation risks may be similar.82 
IV. CONFRONTING THE THREAT: JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS TO 
CHALLENGING TREASURY’S ABUSE OF POWER 
With respect to most administrative agencies, if an affected 
constituent is displeased with a proposed regulation, it has the right to 
bring a pre-enforcement action against the agency the day the regulation 
is promulgated.83  APA section 704 provides plaintiffs “a cause of action 
to challenge ‘final agency action,’ which includes issuing temporary as 
well as final regulations”, and APA section 702 “waives sovereign 
immunity for actions seeking relief ‘other than money damages’ for any 
‘person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
                                                          
 81.  2014-42 I.R.B. 712; 2015-49 I.R.B. 775. 
 82.  See infra discussions in Part IV. 
 83.   Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1153, 1162 (2008) (citing James T. O’Reilly, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 13:1 (2d ed. 2007) 
(“Pre-enforcement injunction actions sometimes are begun the very day that an agency rule is 
promulgated, with a request that the implementation of the rule be enjoined and that the court stay 
the effective date of the rule pending outcome of the litigation.”)); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. et al., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.7.4. (4th ed. 2004) (“In many circumstances, however, a 
party displeased with a regulation would prefer to wait and to challenge all aspects of that regulation 
in a proceeding in which that regulation is applied.”). 
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statute.’”84  The Supreme Court held in Abbott Labs. v. Gardner85 that a 
plaintiff has standing prior to the enforcement of a regulation by an 
agency in instances where the plaintiff is the subject of the regulation and 
risks penalties if it fails to comply.  Since Abbott, courts have regularly 
allowed judicial review of pre-enforcement regulatory actions in a 
variety of circumstances.86 
However, because the specific statutory standing rules under I.R.C. 
section 7421 and the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”)87 applicable to 
tax cases supersede the APA, pre-enforcement judicial review of 
Treasury’s regulatory actions is extremely difficult and uncommon.88  
Moreover, even if a taxpayer survives I.R.C. section 7421 and DJA 
challenges, there would remain significant hurdles in the Article III 
justiciability doctrines to overcome.  As a result, most challenges to 
Treasury regulations occur in one of two postures.  The first is in refund 
litigation, where a taxpayer has paid the applicable taxes and penalties 
owed pursuant to the challenged regulation and then sues for a refund.  
The second is when after reviewing the taxpayer’s filings the IRS 
assesses a deficiency against a taxpayer for failing to follow the 
challenged regulation, and the taxpayer challenges the deficiency. 
A. Section 7421 and the Declaratory Judgment Act 
I.R.C. section 7421 (also known as the “Anti-Injunction Act”) 
provides that, subject to limited exceptions, “no suit for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in 
any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against 
whom such tax was assessed.”89  This rule has been interpreted broadly 
to apply not only to the “assessment or collection” of taxes, but also to 
any activities that have the potential to or are intended to lead to the 
                                                          
 84.  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1162–63. 
 85.  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967). 
 86.  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1163. 
 87.  28 U.S.C.S. § 2201 (2000). 
 88.  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1174 (“In other words, consistent with scholarly expectations, 
the limitations posed by I.R.C. § 7421, the DJA, and judicial interpretations thereof have created a 
climate that simply disfavors allowing courts to remedy legal wrongs in the tax context through pre-
enforcement review. Thus, in this climate, even where courts might be inclined to interpret I.R.C. § 
7421 and the DJA to allow pre-enforcement APA procedural challenges against Treasury regulations 
to proceed, they may nevertheless decline jurisdiction on other more general grounds.”). 
 89.  I.R.C. § 7421 contains limited procedural and substantive exceptions.  Hickman, supra note 
83, at 1165 (For example, judicial review is permitted if the IRS fails to send a notice of deficiency 
prior to collection or if a taxpayer is seeking a determination of whether he or she is an employee for 
employment tax purposes). 
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assessment or collection of taxes.90  It has also been held to apply with 
respect to constitutional claims.91  Likewise, the DJA provides that courts 
are prohibited from issuing declaratory judgments “with respect to 
Federal taxes,” with limited exceptions.92  Courts have routinely held that 
the DJA and I.R.C. section 7421 are coextensive.93 
Although the legislative history is sparse, in Enochs v. Williams 
Packing & Navig. Co., the Supreme Court announced that the “manifest 
purpose of [I.R.C. section] 7421(a) is to permit the United States to 
assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, 
and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a 
suit for refund” in order to ensure “the United States is assured of prompt 
collection of its lawful revenue.”94  It further held that only if it is 
“apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the 
United States cannot establish its claim,” and “the taxpayer would suffer 
irreparable injury if collection were effected” may a suit for an injunction 
be maintained.95  The Court further emphasized that “[t]o require more 
than good faith on the part of the Government would unduly interfere 
with a collateral objective of the [Anti-Injunction] Act—protection of the 
collector from litigation pending a suit for refund.”96 
Thus, even under this so-called “Williams Packing exception,” courts 
are only permitted to consider a pre-enforcement review if both the 
requirements of no colorable claim and irreparable injury are satisfied.97  
Importantly, under the second requirement, courts have consistently held 
that taxpayers’ claims of irreparable harm are undermined by the fact 
they can pay the tax and sue for refund.98  Accordingly, even if Treasury 
completely disregarded the express provisions of the Code and had little 
                                                          
 90.  For these purposes pre-enforcement review has also been denied with respect to the 
collection of penalties, which were held to be part of the “tax” under § 7421.  See, e.g., Mobile 
Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 91.  See, e.g., Alexander v. ‘Americans United’ Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 (1974) (“[D]ecisions of 
this Court make it unmistakably clear that the constitutional nature of a taxpayer’s claim . . . is of no 
consequence under the Anti-Injunction Act.”). 
 92.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2016). Exceptions include certain declaratory judgments in 
bankruptcy and for qualification of tax-exempt status. 
 93.  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1166.  See, e.g., Ambort v. United States, 392 F.3d 1138, 1140 
(10th Cir. 2004); Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 94.  370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 7–8. 
 97.  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1170–1.  See, e.g., Alexander v. ‘Americans United’ Inc., 416 
U.S. 752, 758 (1974). 
 98.  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1171.  See, e.g., United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. et 
al., 419 U.S. 7, 11 (1974). 
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to no factual basis for its actions, under the second prong a taxpayer still 
would have a nearly impossible case for gaining pre-enforcement relief.99 
B. Justiciability Limitations 
Even if a taxpayer survives I.R.C. section 7421 and DJA challenges, 
there would remain significant hurdles in the Article III justiciability 
doctrines to overcome.  Because most pre-enforcement cases are blocked 
by I.R.C. section 7421 and the DJA, courts rarely deal with the more 
general issues of standing and ripeness as they relate to Treasury 
regulations: “Nevertheless, several judicial opinions that do tread such 
ground reinforce the unavailability of pre-enforcement judicial review 
for Treasury regulations by accepting what appears to be a more 
restrictive view of standing or ripeness doctrine in tax cases as opposed 
to other areas of administrative law.”100 
Article III requires that a taxpayer satisfy the basic case or 
controversy standing requirements.101  If a taxpayer is merely subject to a 
notice and Treasury has not issued any actual regulations yet, then 
clearly ripeness and finality doctrines are problematic for the taxpayer.102  
Moreover, at a minimum to have standing in compliance with Article III, 
the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, there must be a causal 
relationship between the harm and the complained action, and it must be 
likely that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.103  With 
respect to the Inversion Notices, and even the Inversion Regulations, 
Article III’s “injury in fact” requirements pose a significant hurdle for 
taxpayers wanting to bring a direct APA challenge without having to 
engage in a transaction to which the regulations would apply.104 
                                                          
 99.  In Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court did find I.R.C. § 7421 did not 
prevent the constitutional challenge of the patient mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act because the shared patient responsibility constitutes a penalty, and not a tax, for purposes 
of the statute. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2583–84 (2012). 
 100.  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1174.  
 101.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“One of those landmarks, 
setting apart the ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III—
‘serv[ing] to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial 
process,’—is the doctrine of standing.  Though some of its elements express merely prudential 
considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an 
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 102.  See Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1, 7, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 103.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (internal citations omitted). 
 104.  Patrick J. Smith, Standing Issues in Direct APA Challenges to Tax Regulations, 149 TAX 
NOTES 1033, 1037 (Nov. 23, 2015) (“The government will most likely rely on the injury-in-fact 
requirement in arguing that taxpayers bringing direct APA challenges to tax regulations in district 
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The obvious problem with respect to the Inversion Notices and 
Regulations is that a corporation would actually need to invert in order to 
truly test the provisions.  Inversion is not an action that can be readily 
undone.  Before the corporation spends the considerable time and 
resources necessary to execute such a transaction, they would want to 
have some certainty as to how the corporation would be taxed going 
forward.  Indeed, tax considerations in many instances are a primary 
driver of the inversion structures.  Thus in order for taxpayers to gain 
clarity on the legality of the regulations ex ante, they will need to argue 
that they are in fact harmed by being forced to refrain from the 
transaction because of the potential threat of dubious regulations.105 
C. Deference and Mayo’s “End” of Tax Exceptionalism 
If a taxpayer is able to challenge Treasury regulations in court, what 
deference will they be afforded?  In Mayo Foundation, the Supreme 
Court found that Chevron and Mead provide the appropriate framework 
for analyzing Treasury’s rulemaking authority and rejected tax 
exceptionalism.106  Historically, Treasury maintained a special 
administrative status and repeatedly stretched the bounds of its power to 
issue general and interpretive authority regulations and bypass 
requirements under the APA.  Congress itself has expressly given 
Treasury the ability to use temporary and retroactive regulations.  
Notwithstanding the Mayo Foundation decision, Treasury’s recent 
responses to the proliferation of corporate tax inversions have again 
resurrected its claim for tax exceptionalism. 
As a general matter, agency rules are entitled to either strong 
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.107 if the agency’s actions satisfy both prongs of the two-
                                                          
court lack standing if they have not engaged in at least one transaction to which the challenged 
regulation would apply.  The reasoning would be that the challenger has not suffered an injury in 
fact as a result of the issuance of the regulations.  According to the [Lujan] Court, an injury must be 
actual or imminent — not conjectural or hypothetical — to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for 
standing.  The government will likely argue that any injury suffered by a taxpayer that has not 
engaged in a transaction to which the regulations would apply is only conjectural or hypothetical.”). 
 105.   Id. at 1037–38 (“The taxpayer’s counterargument would be that a party can be an object of 
regulations without having actually engaged in a transaction to which they would apply.  The 
reasoning would be that the regulations have harmed the taxpayer by making it less desirable and 
less advantageous to engage in the type of transaction to which the regulations would apply and that, 
in the absence of the adverse tax consequences, the taxpayer clearly would have engaged in it.  In 
other words, the taxpayer is harmed by the challenged regulations because it is refraining from that 
transaction.”). 
 106.  562 U.S. 44, 52–60 (2011). 
 107.  467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  Chevron first asks whether “Congress has directly spoken to the 
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step test set forth in United States v. Mead Corp.108, or are otherwise 
entitled to the lesser sliding-scale deference of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.109  
However, prior to Mayo, courts found that in many cases tax regulations 
should be treated differently, providing a basis for so-called tax 
exceptionalism.  In particular, many argued that while Chevron 
deference was available for Treasury regulations issued pursuant to 
specific grants of congressional authority, the lesser deference of 
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States110 applied when 
Treasury exercised its regulatory powers under general grants of 
authority, such as that in I.R.C. section 7805(a), authorizing Treasury to 
issue “all needful rules and regulations.”111 
In Mayo, the Supreme Court definitively held that tax is not special 
and absent a “justification to do so” Treasury regulations should be 
analyzed under the same framework used by all other areas of 
administrative law.112  The Court stated that it is “not inclined to carve 
out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. To the 
contrary, [it has] expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining 
a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.’”113  It 
further held that all Treasury regulations that satisfy Mead are Chevron-
                                                          
precise question at issue” or whether Congress left an ambiguity.  Id. at 842.  In the latter case, a 
court should uphold that agency’s interpretation so long as it is a “permissible construction” that is 
not “arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id. at 843–44. 
 108.  533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  Under Mead, the court must first ask whether Congress 
“delegated authority to the agency . . . to make rules carrying the force of the law,” and then ask 
whether the regulation is “promulgated in the exercise of th[e] authority.”  Id. 
 109.  323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  Under Skidmore, the level of deference given to agency action 
should “depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”  Id.  Note that there are many permutations to the 
implementation and contours of this standard in administrative law jurisprudence, but this is an 
articulation of the general rule. 
 110.  440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (“In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the 
congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with 
the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose.  A regulation may have particular force 
if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have been 
aware of congressional intent.  If the regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it 
evolved merits inquiry.  Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regulation has been 
in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the commissioner’s interpretation, and the 
degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the 
statute.”). 
 111.  See Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981); United States v. Vogel 
Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (although Rowan and Vogel pre-date Chevron and Mead, the 
latter two cases were not tax-specific). 
 112.  Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011); see 
also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1847 (2012).  
 113.  Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 55. 
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eligible.114  Specifically, it rejected any distinction between specific and 
general grants of authority and made clear that even if Treasury exercises 
its regulatory powers under general grants of authority, such as that in 
I.R.C. section 7805(a), as long as they are issued pursuant to notice and 
comment, they should be eligible for Chevron deference.115 
A second potentially less Treasury-favorable implication of Mayo is 
that Treasury may no longer be able to claim, as it historically has done, 
that the vast majority of its tax regulations are simply exempt from APA 
requirements. Historically, Treasury has maintained that most of its rules 
promulgated under general grants of authority are not legislative rules 
subject to the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of APA 
sections 553(b) and (c).116  Rather, Treasury argues that these rules 
satisfy one of the interpretative rule, procedural rule, or good cause 
exceptions from those procedures.117  However, the Court in Mayo, at 
least with respect to judicial review, eliminated the difference between 
Treasury’s regulations issued under grants of specific versus general 
grants of authority.118  Thus, to the extent that Mayo more broadly ended 
tax exceptionalism, Treasury may have even shakier ground to claim that 
its regulations are somehow special and therefore exempt from the 
                                                          
 114.  Id. at 57 (“We believe Chevron and Mead, rather than National Muffler and Rowan, 
provide the appropriate framework for evaluating [tax regulations].”). 
 115.  Id. at 56–58 (“We have held that Chevron deference is appropriate ‘when it appears that 
Congress has delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, 
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.’  Our inquiry in that regard does not turn on whether Congress’s delegation of authority 
was general or specific . . . .  The Department issued the full-time employee rule only after notice-
and-comment procedures, again a consideration identified in our precedents as a ‘significant’ sign 
that a rule merits Chevron deference.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 116.  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1157–58.  
 117.  Id. at 1159 (“At a minimum, the tax community has always understood that Treasury 
regulations promulgated pursuant to specific grants of authority in substantive I.R.C. provisions are 
legislative in character.  Yet, Treasury often fails to follow APA rulemaking requirements even 
when it issues regulations pursuant to such authority.  On those infrequent occasions when Treasury 
makes an explicit claim to the good cause exception, Treasury rarely offers the sort of particularized 
explanation often demanded by the courts.”). 
 118.  In Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, the Tax Court invalidated regulations under I.R.C. section 482 
that were issued in 2003 on the procedural grounds that the IRS did not provide sufficient 
explanation for its rulemaking. 145 T.C. No. 3 (July 27, 2015).  Even prior to Mayo and Altera, 
Kristin Hickman persuasively argued that, “[Treasury’s] position is generally implausible under 
modern conceptions of the distinction between legislative and interpretative rules, murky as that 
doctrine is.”  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1158; see also Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the 
Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking 
Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1740–59 (2007) (documenting methodology and 
findings of study of 232 regulatory projects for which Treasury published notices of proposed 
rulemaking, temporary regulations, or final regulations in the Federal Register between January 1, 
2003, and December 31, 2005). 
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general APA rules that other administrative agencies must comply 
with.119 
Even if it is true that Treasury can no longer claim broad exemption, 
compliance with APA notice and comment by itself does not guarantee 
that more taxpayer friendly regulations will ensue.  This is particularly 
true with respect to issues about which Treasury feels strongly and with 
respect to issues affecting disparate taxpayers with no common lobbying 
efforts.  In fact, in order to make sure it avails itself of Chevron 
eligibility, Treasury may more strategically engage in notice and 
comment procedures, as it did with the Inversion Notices, particularly 
when it believes it is acting on shaky legal ground.  Not only will 
Treasury have a strong argument that the Mead requirements are 
satisfied, as discussed above, increasing notice can actually extend 
Treasury’s ability to issue retroactive regulations.120 
D. What is a Taxpayer Left to Do? 
Because most pre-enforcement judicial review actions would likely 
be barred under I.R.C. section 7421 and the DJA, any remaining cases 
would have a tough time overcoming Article III standing and ripeness 
limitations, and once in court Treasury would likely enjoy Chevron 
deference, what other options does a taxpayer have in the face of 
questionable Treasury regulations?  A taxpayer is left with a few choices, 
none of them arguably as ideal as pre-enforcement review. 
First, a taxpayer may sue for refund.  However, this response is not 
an option if the taxpayer lacks the financial resources to pay the resulting 
tax or if the taxpayer does not want to suffer the economic burdens that 
would ensue if a court upholds Treasury’s actions.  For example, in the 
case of the Inversion Notices or Regulations, if a taxpayer engages in an 
inversion transaction, it must “overpay” its taxes by failing to claim any 
of the purported benefits from the inversion and then sue for a refund and 
hope those monies are recovered.  Second, a taxpayer may act in 
contravention to Treasury’s rules and claim the benefits on its return and 
wait for a notice of deficiency from the IRS.  However, this requires the 
taxpayer to subject itself to understatement penalties and closer scrutiny 
                                                          
 119.  See Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and Enhancing 
Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 550 (2012) (“As Mayo did not speak to that issue precisely, it 
remains to be seen how the tax bar’s exceptional approach to public participation will fare.”). 
 120.  This phenomenon, although statutorily permissible under I.R.C. section 7805(b)(3), is in 
direct contravention of typical APA procedures that require final regulations to be issued 
prospectively following the required notice and comment period. 
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of its entire return.121  Moreover, the taxpayer has to wait for the IRS to 
act before it is able to bring its case to court.  Third, even if a taxpayer 
engages in a transaction not in compliance with Treasury’s guidance, it 
may choose to seek pre-litigation settlement with the IRS.  While a 
taxpayer has the potential to gain more favorable terms in the settlement 
than it would in court, the outcome is largely out of the control of the 
taxpayer’s hands and the process is not able to create binding precedent 
on the IRS to the extent the underlying substantive issue is recurring. 
As a result of the lack of any favorable choices, in many cases, the 
easiest option is for taxpayers to merely comply with the dubious 
Treasury action, even if they believe it involves an unlawful exercise of 
Treasury’s powers.  Otherwise taxpayers will “put themselves through 
the effort of raising a challenge, placing themselves in a negative 
enforcement position or operating indefinitely in a state of uncertainty 
regarding tax noncompliance and the potential consequences.”122 
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREAT OF LAW 
In this Article, I argue that when Treasury acts under the guise of 
authority, when it is unclear or doubtful it actually possesses the legal 
authority to do so, it is able to effectively exert over taxpayers a threat of 
law.  Whether or not this type of threat is desirable or legally 
defensible,123 it can nevertheless be an effective tool for Treasury 
because taxpayers often cave in or otherwise modify their behavior in 
response. 
A. The Full Force of the Threat of Law 
Even highly sophisticated taxpayers with ample available resources 
to fight Treasury are keenly aware of the inevitable uphill battle they 
must face.  As discussed above, in the first instance, taxpayers face 
significant challenges to obtaining pre-enforcement review of even the 
most questionable Treasury actions under I.R.C. section 7421 and the 
                                                          
 121.  Negligence or Disregard of Rules of Regulations, 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662–3 (2016). 
 122.  Hickman, supra note 83, at 1182 (“Many taxpayers undoubtedly elect to comply with or 
rearrange their affairs to avoid regulations that they find questionable . . .”). 
 123.  See, e.g., Wu, supra note 3, at 1854 (“Beyond this basic division, several other areas can be 
identified in which threats may constitute an abuse, as opposed to a useful tool.  The first is when an 
agency uses threats to take actions that Congress has specifically barred, or to accomplish objectives 
for which it would otherwise lack delegated authority.”).  See also Noah, supra note 3, at 895 
(discussing how the Federal Reserve Board “imposed conditions on (or extracted voluntary 
commitments from) applicants that appear to conflict with limits of its statutory authority.”). 
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DJA.  This lack of a readily available ex ante judicial remedy then leaves 
taxpayers left to choose among the less ideal ex post options.  In some 
instances they may continue with their planned transactions, if possible, 
and then challenge the government after the fact through either a suit for 
refund or challenge to a notice of deficiency.  However, as discussed 
above, both of these options subject the taxpayer to any number of 
undesirable consequences, including exposure to significant financial 
uncertainty, steep litigation costs, and potential understatement penalties.  
As a result, many taxpayers simply choose the option of least resistance 
and greater certainty by merely giving in to Treasury’s threat of law, 
even if they strongly disagree with the legitimacy of Treasury’s power.124 
Treasury’s threat of power, legitimate or not, is buttressed by 
statutory advantages it enjoys and by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mayo.  I.R.C. section 7805(b) explicitly gives Treasury the authority to 
issue regulations retroactive to the date any notice substantially 
describing the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final 
regulation is issued to the public.  This bolsters the threat in several 
regards.  First, even if a notice itself is not binding on taxpayers, it 
creates a threat of law that can nevertheless create the effect of the force 
of law because of the retroactivity.  The final regulations once issued, 
carry the force of law until successfully challenged by the taxpayer, and 
failure to comply with the regulations will subject taxpayers to the 
imposition of understatement penalties.125  As a result, even a non-
binding notice of intention to issue regulations can itself be immediately 
binding in a practical sense, because the contents therein will one day 
become binding retroactively once regulations are in fact issued. 
If a taxpayer does choose to challenge Treasury’s actions in court, 
Mayo has guaranteed that Treasury’s actions will be eligible for the more 
deferential Chevron standard, as opposed to the more taxpayer-favorable 
National Muffler standard, regardless of whether Treasury is acting under 
a specific or general statutory grant of authority, particularly if it allows 
for a notice and comment period.  Moreover, even if the regulation itself 
is struck down, the court can still respect Treasury’s substantive 
interpretation of the law as reasonable and the taxpayer may still lose on 
                                                          
 124.  Indeed, as noted above, although taxpayers have been severely impacted by the regulations, 
it was the United States Chamber of Commerce and the Texas Association of Business that filed a 
lawsuit against the IRS challenging the validity of the temporary Inversion Regulations.  See supra 
note 80 and accompanying text. 
 125.  26 C.F.R. § 1.6662–3(a) (“If any portion of an underpayment, as defined in section 6664(a) 
and § 1.6664–2, of any income tax imposed under subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code that is 
required to be shown on a return is attributable to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, 
there is added to the tax an amount equal to 20 percent of such portion.”). 
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the merits.126  Under National Cable & Telecommunications Association 
v. Brand X Internet Services, any reasonable Treasury interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute can override the prior judicial interpretation of the 
statute if Treasury’s interpretation passes Chevron.127  Combined these 
judicial doctrines create a significant hurdle for taxpayers challenging 
Treasury actions. 
B. Swift Responses to Taxpayer Abuse 
If left largely unchecked by the judicial system, should this broad 
threat of power by a regulatory agency otherwise be contained?  In the 
face of aggressive taxpayer abuse, Treasury’s ability to act swiftly to 
curb taxpayer behavior may be desirable, particularly when Congress is 
unable or unwilling to do so.128  Attempting to stay one-step ahead of 
wily taxpayers is nearly an impossible task, and so creating uncertainty 
for taxpayers, either through broad anti-abuse doctrines or other 
measures may be the only effective way to deter abusive transactions.129 
Taxpayers are already subject to challenge by the IRS on 
transactions that have already closed if the transactions lack economic 
substance and have no underlying business purpose other than the 
realization of tax benefits.130  If a transaction fails to satisfy these rules, 
the purported tax benefits of the transaction can be retroactively stripped 
if successfully challenged in court.  While the economic substance 
doctrine may be an invaluable weapon in the IRS’s arsenal against 
abusive transactions, it is unable to stop many of the complicated 
transactions devised by sophisticated taxpayers and their advisors ex 
ante.  However, when combined with the threat of law, Treasury may 
                                                          
 126.  See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 
325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945). 
 127.  545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). 
 128.  Blanchard, supra note 42, at 89 (“[The Inversion Notice was] rushed out in response to 
growing political insistence that something had to be done to stop the so-called tsunami of inversions 
supposedly taking place in recent months.  Given the political deadlock in Congress, the executive 
and legislative branches appeared to be largely in agreement that for the time being, it was up to the 
IRS to take action—so it did.”).  See also Wu, supra note 3, at 1851 (“The greatest advantage of a 
threat regime is its speed and flexibility.”). 
 129.  See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 249 (2002) 
(discussing the role uncertainty may play in deterring tax shelters). 
 130.  Under long-standing case law principles, recently codified in part by I.R.C. section 
7701(o), this threat against improper taxpayer behavior may not in substance really expand 
Treasury’s otherwise existing powers.  26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2012) (a “transaction shall be treated as 
having economic substance only if (A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from 
Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (B) the taxpayer has a substantial 
purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.”). 
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have a much more effective weapon to fight perceived tax abuses.  A 
notice for retroactive regulations or the issuance of dubious proposed, 
temporary or final regulations may serve to broaden the already existing 
cloud under which taxpayers must operate.  The threat of law will thus 
serve as a way to affect taxpayer behavior while waiting for Congress to 
take action, even if it does not have the authority to do so. 
C. A Solution for Congressional Inaction? 
The threat of law can be used to motivate an otherwise dormant or 
gridlocked Congress into timely passing, or at least considering, needed 
legislation.  By changing the applicable default rules, unilateral action by 
an agency should propel Congress into action, particularly if it has 
overstepped its delegated authority and Congress disagrees with the 
actions the agency has taken.131  If Congress disagrees with the new 
default law, then timely and responsive legislation can be implemented 
to overturn it.  It is likely that to the extent highly organized and/or 
sophisticated groups of taxpayers are adversely affected, the incentive for 
congressional members to act will be even greater.  These affected 
taxpayers can bombard Congress with forceful lobbying efforts, putting 
significant pressure on them to strike down the offensive threat of law. 
On the other hand, even if Congress agrees with the agency’s new 
regulatory action, it may still need to codify the changes, particularly if 
the regulations were enacted under a questionable delegation of 
authority.  While the pressure may not be as great on Congress to pass 
new legislation if the threat of law sufficiently changes the default rules, 
there are still reasons why Congress may feel compelled to act.  If the 
new change in law is truly desirable, Congress may want to insulate it 
from any future legal challenges and/or expand it to make it more 
effective.132  Even more compellingly, if, as was the case with the 
                                                          
 131.  Shay, supra note 12, at 477 (“The obvious advantage of taking regulatory action is the 
ability to act quickly.  That is especially important because more and more companies are planning 
or seeking transactions that take advantage of apparent statutory loopholes. . . . The exercise of 
regulatory authority changes the default position.  Instead of waiting for Congress to act and relying 
on the market to deal with the risk of losing the corporate tax base in the meantime (in hopes there 
would be an inadequate supply of foreign targets or the price or risk of acquiring foreign targets goes 
too high), adopting regulations first would reduce the risk to the U.S. corporate tax base while 
Congress considers how to address the problem in legislation as part of tax reform or otherwise.”). 
 132.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Omri Marian, Inversions and Competiveness: Reflections in the 
Wake of Pfizer/Allergan, MICH. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERS. 9 (Dec. 14, 2015) 
(“Treasury’s limited regulatory authority clearly establishes that the solution to inversions cannot 
come in a form of administrative notices.”), 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=8120980250880670901060730160670230730280460
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Inversion Notices and Regulations, the proposed provisions are revenue 
raisers, Congress will be able to capitalize on having additional revenue 
offsets for its budget planning purposes if the regulations are enacted as 
law.133 
D. Limitations on the Remedies for the Threat of Law 
Despite the potential benefits a threat of law may yield, the question 
remains, if taxpayers are not engaged in abusive transactions and 
Treasury has merely overstepped its regulatory authority, what 
limitations should the threat of law face?  Given the difficult time 
taxpayers have seeking pre-enforcement judicial review of their 
grievances, sentiments of unfairness and lack of due process are certainly 
warranted.  Indeed, even in Enochs, where the Supreme Court openly 
accepted the limitations imposed by I.R.C. section 7421, it stated a 
presumption that Treasury would be acting in “good faith.”134 To the 
extent that this assumption is no longer warranted, it seems that 
permitting a continued expansive application of I.R.C. section 7421 and 
the DJA to inhibit pre-enforcement review is no longer warranted.  
Rather, taxpayers must have some available avenue to challenge ex ante 
regulations resulting from an abuse of power. 
If pre-enforcement judicial review is not feasible, taxpayers may also 
get relief through another avenue, although it has only been done once 
before.135  A final administrative rule can be overturned through the 
Congressional Review Act (the “CRA”) as long as lawmakers in both 
houses of Congress are able to pass a “resolution of disapproval” and get 
the signature of the President (or have two-thirds majorities in both 




 133.  Shay, supra note 12, at 477–78 (“The Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014 is estimated 
by the Joint Committee on Taxation to raise $19.5 billion over 10 years.  A regulatory change is not 
treated as raising revenue until revenue is received (that is, loss of revenue does not occur).  It does 
not have the benefit of making available a revenue offset for Congress to use for an alternative 
purpose.”). 
 134.  Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., Inc., 370 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1962) (“[Section 
7421(a)] indicates that if Congress had desired to make the availability of the injunctive remedy 
against the collection of federal taxes not lawfully due depend upon the adequacy of the legal 
remedy, it would have said so explicitly.  Its failure to do so shows that such a suit may not be 
entertained merely because collection would cause an irreparable injury, such as the ruination of the 
taxpayer’s enterprise.”). 
 135.  The Congressional Review Act followed the election of George W. Bush and was passed to 
overturn a regulation issued late in President Bill Clinton’s last term which required new ergonomic 
rules for office workers. 
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houses).136  This is not an adequate remedy for taxpayers subject to 
Treasury overreaching for several reasons.  First, the CRA requires the 
same level of congressional support that it would require to simply pass 
tax legislation overruling the offending regulation.  It also requires that 
the President reject Treasury’s use of regulatory power.  In the case 
where the President supports Treasury’s use of power, particularly where 
Congress is unable or unwilling to act, regulations with the threat of law 
may end up standing absent contrary support from a super-majority of 
Congress. 
Ultimately, absent an enhanced access to pre-enforcement judicial 
review or a diminished standard of review for examining Treasury’s 
exercises of a threat of law, current remedies for taxpayers affected by 
Treasury’s overreaching regulatory actions, such as those in the 
Inversion Notices and Regulations, may be insufficient.  While the need 
for Treasury to be able to respond swiftly to actual taxpayer abuses may 
be helpful, and at times necessary, exceeding the bounds of its regulatory 
authority cannot be the accepted solution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While it is clear that even a threat of law can have a chilling effect on 
taxpayers, when adequate statutory authority does not exist, ultimately it 
can not be a permanent substitute for legislative action.  Presumably, 
regulated entities should be more willing to actively defy a dubious 
exercise of regulatory authority, particularly when they sense an 
impotent Congress that is unable or unwilling to address the underlying 
issue.  However, in many cases the stakes for the regulatees are too high. 
Given the difficulties taxpayers face in challenging an improper 
threat of law by Treasury ex ante through traditional channels, such as 
the courts, it becomes extremely important that there are ways in which 
Treasury is restricted from acting in defiance of its statutory authority.  
Procedural and/or judicial safeguards must be put in place in order to 
ensure there are adequate checks and balances on perceived abuses of 
Treasury’s powers.  One potential solution would be a more narrow 
application of I.R.C. section 7421 and the DJA.  Moreover, to the extent 
that Congress more regularly and timely engages in substantive law 
making, administrative agencies will have fewer opportunities to engage 
in overreaching, quasi-legislative rulemaking. 
                                                          
 136.  5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2006). 
